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Abstract 
Blockchain is rapidly evolving and there is an increasing interest in the technology in both practice 
and academia. Recently, a blockchain use case called Initial Coin Offering (ICO) draws a lot of atten-
tion. ICO is a novel form of crowdfunding that utilizes blockchain tokens to allow for truly peer-to-peer 
investments. Although, more than 4.5 billion USD have been invested via ICOs, the phenomenon is 
poorly understood. Scientific research lacks a structured classification of ICOs to provide further in-
sights into their characteristics. We bridge this gap by developing a taxonomy based on real-world 
ICO cases, related literature, and expert interviews. Further, we derive and discuss prevailing ICO 
archetypes. Our findings contribute to theory development in the field of ICOs by enriching the de-
scriptive knowledge, identifying design options, deriving ICO archetypes, and laying the foundation for 
further research. Additionally, our research provides several benefits for practitioners. Our proposed 
taxonomy illustrates that there is no one-size-fits-all model of ICOs and might support the decision-
making process of start-ups, investors and regulators. The proposed ICO archetypes indicate how 
common ICOs are designed and thus might serves as best practices. Finally, our analysis indicates that 
ICOs represent a valid alternative to traditional crowdfunding approaches.  
 
Keywords: Blockchain, Smart Contract, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), Token, Token Sales, Cryptocur-
rency, Crowdfunding, Taxonomy. 
 
1 Introduction 
Blockchain is a recent form of distributed ledger technology (DLT) enabling decentralized and transac-
tional data sharing across a network of untrusted participants, that has emerged with the development 
of Bitcoin in 2008 (Fanning and Centers, 2016; Nakamoto, 2008). The first generation of blockchains 
focused on creating the basis for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, which is the native cryptographic 
token of the corresponding blockchain (Brenig et al., 2016). From a technical perspective, these tokens 
serve as a unit of account and are either used for the facilitation of transactions or verification proce-
dures (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015). A second generation of blockchains, such as Ethereum, addi-
tionally provides a general-purpose programmable infrastructure that enables programs that can be 
deployed and run on a blockchain, known as smart contracts (Glaser, 2017; Xu et al., 2017). Smart 
contracts enable more complex programmable transactions and can be used to control digital assets, to 
implement a trust-free trade of assets and to facilitate the issuance of digital on-chain tokens on top of a 
blockchain network that can act as sub-currencies (Beck et al., 2016; Buterin, 2014, 2016). Recently, 
Fridgen et al. / Don’t slip on the ICO 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 2 
 
driven by the relatively simple way to create tokens via the use of smart contracts, new use cases for 
tokens like giving token holders access to applications or services or grant rights to participate in a 
platforms development emerged (Conley, 2017). Tokens have also been successfully used as a new and 
innovative form of crowdfunding for start-ups to raise early financing, raising a total of 250 million 
USD in 2016 alone and a cumulative funding of 4,518.94 million USD by November 2017 (Coindesk, 
2017; Smith and Crown, 2017). Crowdfunding can be described as an open call for capital mainly via 
the Internet, where a campaign can be evaluated and supported by a large group of individuals, the 
crowd (Danmayr, 2014). While for crowdfunding in the classical sense, the matchmaking process be-
tween campaign creators and potential investors is mainly established by crowdfunding platforms serv-
ing as intermediaries, crowdfunding based on blockchain tokens relies on Peer-to-Peer interactions 
(Haas et al., 2014; Shin, 2017b). The rise of this new phenomenon of publicly offering tokens for sale 
as a way of financing has not been hidden from regulators. The US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) states in a recently published report that “[…] individuals and entities increasingly are 
using distributed ledger technology to offer and sell instruments […] to raise capital” (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2017, p. 10). This young, emerging phenomenon is widely known and dis-
cussed as Initial Coin Offering (ICO) (Coinbase, 2016; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2017).  
Although, there is a rapidly rising interest in ICOs from private and institutional investors, as well as 
capital seeking start-ups, ICOs are poorly understood, and scientific research is scarce (Kuo Chuen et 
al., 2017; Shin, 2017a). Further, regulators struggle to keep up with the rapid innovation and have tak-
en various actions ranging from banning ICOs completely to keeping the market unregulated or treat-
ing only ICOs that fulfil specific criteria (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2017). In addition, 
ICOs are far from being standardized and can be considered very heterogeneous – in the words of the 
Estonian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) "every ICO is unique and should be assessed on its 
own characteristics" (EFSA, 2017). Given these facts, ICO is a technology-driven phenomenon having 
impact on multiple fields of research and practice like blockchain, crowdfunding, and IT architecture, 
thus needs to be addressed by Information System (IS) research. Yet, a systematic understanding of 
what exactly constitutes an ICO is missing but necessary to establish a common knowledge base in 
Information System research that might serve as starting point for further research on success criteria 
and best practices. To address this lack of research, we define the following research question:  
What are the design parameters of Initial Coin Offerings as novel approaches of crowdfunding? 
We seek to bridge this research gap and answer our research question by developing a general taxono-
my of empirically validated ICO design parameters. This approach has been taken several times in 
recent years and proven its applicability in blockchain research (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Xu et 
al., 2017). Since, taxonomies as frameworks are well suited to lay the groundwork for emergent fields 
of research and serve as the first step into systematizing the emerging research domain (Williams et al., 
2008), we follow the established and well-recognized taxonomy development method proposed by 
Nickerson et al. (2013). In the development process, we utilize both literature and empirically verified 
knowledge. From a conceptual perspective, we draw on literature describing well-understood processes 
such as auction mechanisms or research on crowdfunding (Becker, 2001; Danmayr, 2014; Mollick, 
2014). The empirical perspective is represented through 52 real-world ICO cases and 7 semi-structured 
expert interviews with practitioners and researchers involved in ICOs. With our taxonomy, we strive 
for the following theoretical contributions and practical implications. We aim at creating a scientific 
artefact that contributes to the descriptive knowledge of the young research domain concerning ICOs 
and, thus, laying the foundation for further research and higher-theory in the area (Gregor, 2006). Fur-
ther, we pursue to enable practitioners, as well as future researchers in the fields of IS and Finance 
alike, to get a systematic understanding of the emergent phenomenon and the associated consequences.  
After this introduction, in Section 2, we briefly explore the development of ICOs as an emergent phe-
nomenon as well as the overarching areas of blockchain technology, cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, 
tokens, and crowdfunding. Subsequently, in Section 3, we explain our research method. We devote 
Section 4 to the application of the research method and actual development of the taxonomy. In Section 
5, we present the resulting taxonomy and apply taxonomy-based cluster analysis to identify prevailing 
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ICO archetypes in detail. Finally, we discuss the implications and limitations as well as the practical 
contribution and explore further research opportunities in the concluding Section 6. 
2 Foundation 
2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts 
Blockchain is a computer protocol for decentralized and transactional data sharing across a large net-
work of untrusted participants (Xu et al., 2017). Blockchain not only enables new forms of distributed 
software architectures, but also introduces a wide range of use cases for the tokens associated with it, 
ranging from distributed virtual currency, called cryptocurrencies, to asset representation or digital 
rights management on the blockchain (Conley, 2017; Nærland et al., 2017). Public interest in the first 
generation of blockchain technology itself was sparked only when its role as the basis for cryptocur-
rencies was discovered with the publication of the original Bitcoin whitepaper by Satoshi Nakamoto in 
2008 (Nakamoto, 2008; Zohar, 2015). A second generation of blockchain protocols such as the Ethere-
um blockchain, that comes with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, additionally pro-
vide a general-purpose programmable infrastructure enabling the use of smart contracts (Buterin, 
2014). Smart contracts, a concept first introduced by Nick Szabo in 1994, describe a computerized 
transaction protocol that executes terms of a contract whereby it helps to minimize the need for trusted 
intermediaries and transaction costs (Szabo, 1994). In the context of blockchain technology, smart con-
tracts refer to programs that are executed on a blockchain, allowing parties that not necessarily know 
and trust each other to securely transact with each other as the correct execution of these programs is 
enforced by a consensus protocol (Beck et al., 2016; Glaser, 2017; Sillaber and Waltl, 2017). Smart 
contracts enable programmable transactions and can be used to control digital assets, implement a 
trust-free trade of assets and to facilitate the issuance of tokens or ”sub-currencies” on top of a block-
chain, also called ”on-chain tokens” (Buterin, 2014, 2016; Nærland et al., 2017). 
2.2 Tokens and Cryptocurrencies 
While the word “token” has a multitude of meanings, it can be defined as “a piece resembling a coin 
issued as money by some person or body other than a de jure government” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). 
Using tokens as some form of money is not new, as a case from Mexico City in 1776 shows, were 
more than 2,000 shopkeepers issued metal tokens called tlaco (Evans, 2014). We use the term token 
when referring to the usage of digital tokens in the context of blockchain. Viewed from a technical 
perspective, tokens can be used in several cases, such as the facilitation of transactions, as an internal 
unit of account, for the verification of block-writing, or for more creative use uses such as helping to 
prevent unintended use of the blockchain and to grant token holders certain types of privileged access 
(Conley, 2017; Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Schweizer et al., 2017). It is important to distinguish 
between native tokens inherent to a blockchain – so called protocol tokens – on the one hand and on-
chain tokens issued on top of a blockchain using smart contracts, sometimes also called app coins or 
app tokens on the other hand (Buterin, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017; Kuo Chuen et al., 2017; Rauchs and 
Hileman, 2017). 
Before the advent of the second generation of blockchains and the invention of smart contracts that 
enable on-chain token systems, the use of tokens was basically limited to the role of cryptocurrencies 
(Buterin, 2014). Cryptocurrency, a subgroup of virtual currency, is a particular type of digital token, 
which typically functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value (Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, 2017). Tokens don’t necessarily have to be designed to play a currency-like 
role to qualify as virtual currency in a broad sense. They only need to be used as a value that substitutes 
for currency according to the definition of the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (van 
Valkenburgh, 2017b). While cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin as mentioned above, are a fairly recent 
phenomenon, its predecessors, such as the virtual currency eCash, have been around since the 1990s 
(Harvey, 2016). Thus, the European Central Bank (ECB) uses the umbrella-term “virtual currency 
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schemes” and distinguishes e-money which is issued by a centralized unit, such as eCash or Second 
Life’s Linden Dollar, from cryptocurrencies, which are issued in a decentralized manner using block-
chain technology (ECB, 2015). Like central bank issued currencies, cryptocurrencies and tokens alike, 
unofficially follow the ISO 4217 norm, a standard that delineates currency designators (Swendseid, 
2016). Following the naming convention for supranational currencies, they use 3-letter combinations 
such as “BTC” (short for Bitcoin) to appear more trustworthy (Swendseid, 2016). While cryptocurren-
cies have a shorter settlement period compared to traditional fiat currencies such as Euro or US-Dollar, 
according to the ECB they lack transparency, experience high volatility and a high amount of credit, 
liquidity, legal and operational risks (ECB, 2015; Juri, 2015). Yet, two years after the ECB report was 
issued, over 1,000 cryptocurrencies have been launched and are traded with a total market capitaliza-
tion of more than 200 billion USD (Kelly, 2017). 
Aside from cryptocurrencies, on-chain tokens created by smart contracts have a much broader spec-
trum of functions such as asset tokens or usage tokens (Buterin, 2014). While asset tokens are a cryp-
tographic representation of traditional assets, such as gold, equity or fiat currency, usage tokens pro-
vide access to digital services (Tomaino, 2017). The most prominent enabler of on-chain tokens is the 
Ethereum blockchain, where a standard called “ERC20” for issuing tokens using smart contracts exists, 
which is commonly used among token creators (Vogelsteller, 2015). The distribution of these tokens 
can be facilitated through a variety of ways. Usually, as a giveaway to developers, a portion of the to-
kens created is set aside for developers working on a certain project. Another possibility used in a few 
cases is to credit tokens to holders of existing cryptocurrencies for free, a process called airdrop (van 
Valkenburgh, 2017a). A more sophisticated approach of distributing native blockchain tokens inherent 
to a blockchain relying on a so-called proof-of-work algorithm is by mining, a resource-intensive pro-
cess where cryptographic puzzles are computationally solved, and the community is incentivized to 
contribute computational resources to a project. Finally crowdfunding – a process called Initial Coin 
Offering – can be used to distribute token against payment (Conley, 2017; Johnston et al., 2017). 
2.3 Crowdfunding 
With the advent of the Web 2.0 paradigm, which has enabled internet users to participate and collabo-
rate online, new forms of peer-to-peer finance, like crowdsourcing emerged (Moenninghoff and 
Wieandt, 2013). Crowdsourcing is defined as the acquisition of any resource such as services, creative 
content or funds from a large group that is typically online (Pelizzon et al., 2016). Crowdfunding, a 
term which was introduced in 2006 by Michael Sullivan, is a sub-area of crowdsourcing and peer-to-
peer finance, that represents a novel financing segment for consumers and small businesses (Moen-
ninghoff and Wieandt, 2013; Pelizzon et al., 2016). By allowing a crowd to assess the economic poten-
tial of a product, company or project, it utilizes the wisdom of the crowd (Danmayr, 2014; Mollick, 
2014). Thus, crowdfunding can be defined as “a collective effort by people who network and pool their 
money together, usually via the internet, in order to invest in and support efforts initiated by other peo-
ple or organizations.” (Ordanini et al., 2011, p. 1). Before the invention of crowdfunding, accessibility 
of finance was highly concentrated in a few areas, where both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
could be found. Online crowdfunding is able to drive the geographic dispersion of financiers of small, 
early stage projects as communication by means of the internet is relatively inexpensive (Agrawal et 
al., 2010; Danmayr, 2014). Due to wide differences in national regulations, however, it is far away 
from becoming truly global (Moenninghoff and Wieandt, 2013). Assessing the status of crowdfunding, 
Danmayr (2014) found that there are still several hurdles related to cross-border activities. Further-
more, crowdfunding that is facilitated via web platforms heavily relies on trusted third parties, as the 
majority of crowdfunding platforms operates on top of traditional financing mechanisms, such as banks 
and payment service providers (Haas et al., 2015; Schweizer et al., 2017). 
2.4 From Crowdfunding to Initial Coin Offering 
While the sale of tokens in general could be facilitated without the use of a blockchain or crowdfund-
ing, the combinations of the two enables a completely new phenomenon: Initial Coin Offering. The 
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abbreviation ICO bears some resemblance to IPO (Initial Public Offering), yet their structures and pro-
cesses differ in many aspects such as underwriting, distribution and regulation (Ellis et al., 1999; Kuo 
Chuen, 2017). The phenomenon was first titled “The Bitcoin Model for Crowdfunding” in the year 
2014 and described as a new business model for open source software, where any participant of a 
blockchain protocol can participate anonymously in the funding, development and revenue collection 
using tokens (Ravikant, 2014). This entirely new business model, which is completely decentralized as 
it relies solely on peer-to-peer mechanisms, represents a stark contrast to crowdfunding in the tradi-
tional sense, where the matchmaking process between campaign creators and potential investors is 
often established by crowdfunding platforms and banks serving as intermediary (Danmayr, 2014; Ehr-
sam, 2016; Haas et al., 2015; Schweizer et al., 2017). ICOs are completely open and enable a global 
base of investors to participate. However, a factor that negatively affects the global reach is the limited 
access to cryptocurrencies, which are in most cases required to invest. The limited access is primarily 
imposed by regulations of exchanges relying on legal restrictions and the need to perform lengthy cus-
tomer background checks. Although the majority of ICOs focuses on investments through cryptocur-
rencies, the tokens sold in an ICO can represent a much broader spectrum of functions than the launch 
of a new cryptocurrency. The rationale behind ICOs differs and different types of tokens such as asset 
tokens or usage tokens can be sold. Currently ICOs are used to fund the development of blockchain-
related projects such as new protocols or apps enabled by smart contracts in advance, even before the 
actual start of the project (Ehrsam, 2016; Kuo Chuen et al., 2017). According to the venture capitalist 
Ehrsam, the ICO model of funding projects in advance can also help to overcome the classic “chicken 
and egg” problem for networks. As the distribution of tokens gives users partial ownership in a net-
work, it incentivizes potential users to join the network early to profit from a potential appreciation of 
the token price (Ehrsam, 2016). The ICO process typically looks as follows: In a first step, developers 
release a whitepaper that describes the program or protocol, its features, and its implementation. Af-
terwards, in a second step, they conduct a presale, often limited to large investors or people close to the 
project team. In a third step, the actual ICO takes place at a preannounced date where the public can 
purchase tokens in order to participate in the project and in some cases, have a stake in the project 
(Johnston et al., 2017; Kuo Chuen et al., 2017). As we indicate above, this new form of crowdfunding 
differs significantly from former constellations and has its distinct characteristics. To better understand 
the emerging phenomenon scientific research is required. For the systemization of such phenomenon 
taxonomy development has proven its efficacy and serves as the first step into emerging research do-
mains (Miller and Roth, 1994; Wand et al., 1995). 
3 Method 
In this paper, we develop a taxonomy to answer our research question and to conduct a first step to-
wards systematizing the emerging research domain of ICOs. A taxonomy can be considered as the 
result of a design science research approach and, thus, be viewed as an artefact that consists of dimen-
sions containing characteristics that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Nickerson et 
al., 2010). According to Glass and Vessey (1995), taxonomy development refers to a method of “as-
signing members to categories in a complete and unambiguous way”. We deliberately chose the term 
taxonomy over alternatives such as framework or typology, as it is the most widely used among the 
scientific community (Nickerson et al., 2013). The purpose of a taxonomy is to lay the fundament for 
further research by systematically classifying characteristics of ICOs and thus, fostering the under-
standing of the phenomenon (Glass and Vessey, 1995). The focus on the process of classification al-
lows for a systematic examination of the general principles and issues underlying the classification 
scheme. Equally important, taxonomies can help to predict future development areas, similar to the 
periodic table which predicted the existence of elements decades before they could be isolated (Glass 
and Vessey, 1995). A multitude of scientific studies have been successfully relying on the creation or 
use of taxonomies to lay the groundwork for emergent fields of research, when exploring a young field 
such as cloud computing (Keller and König, 2014), decentralized consensus systems (Glaser and Bez-
zenberger, 2015), smart things (Püschel et al., 2016), agile IT setups (Jöhnk et al., 2017) and block-
chain-based systems (Xu et al., 2017). In line with these best practices we follow the iterative design-
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oriented taxonomy development method proposed by Nickerson et al. (2013), which goes beyond the 
traditional approach as proposed by Bailey (1984). This method integrates conceptual and empirical 
perspectives into one comprehensive method and, thus, fosters the iterative usage of both paradigms 
(Nickerson et al., 2013). The taxonomy development method comprises the following seven steps: 1) 
determination of a meta-characteristic, 2) determination of ending conditions, 3) choice of approach 
(i.e., empirical-to-conceptual or conceptual-to-empirical), 4) conceptualization of characteristics and 
dimensions 5) examination of objects, 6) design (i.e., initial design or revision of the taxonomy) and 7) 
testing of the ending conditions. While the researcher chooses the meta-characteristic and ending con-
ditions at the beginning of the development process, several iterations of taxonomy design and im-
provement follow (steps 3 to 6). It is important to note, that the researcher decides for an approach in 
every iteration (either empirical-to-conceptual or conceptual-to-empirical). The researcher tests the 
resulting taxonomy after each iteration against the ending conditions until they are finally met. Since 
taxonomies not only systematically describe current relationships, and dependencies of a specific field 
of research, but also allow to evaluate future developments. Thus, we use the final taxonomy to classify 
our ICO sample and apply a cluster analysis to identify predominant ICO pattern that represent valid 
starting points for future in-depth evaluations to better understand the evolution of ICOs. 
4 Application of the Research Method 
Following the approach of Nickerson et al. (2013), we define our meta-characteristic in step 1. Since 
the meta-characteristic is the most comprehensive characteristic, it is directly reflecting the purpose of 
the taxonomy. Further, it is important to define the purpose according to the target group of the taxon-
omy to enable understanding and appropriate use (Nickerson et al., 2013). As our study aims to serve 
as a basis for further research not only for the IS discipline but also for the Finance discipline, we de-
fine our meta-characteristic as follows: Design parameters and characteristics of Initial Coin Offerings 
as a novel form of crowdfunding. 
In step 2, we define the ending conditions for evaluation of the resulting taxonomy after each develop-
ment iteration. We apply both the subjective and objective ending conditions proposed by Nickerson et 
al. (2013). To fulfil the subjective ending conditions, the taxonomy should be concise, meaning it con-
tains a limited number of dimensions as well as a limited number of characteristics in each dimension 
(Bailey, 1994). Yet, to be robust, it also should still contain just enough dimensions and characteristics 
to differentiate the object of interest (Nickerson et al., 2013). To be conceived as comprehensive, the 
taxonomy should be able to classify all known objects in the specific domain and include all dimen-
sions of the objects of interest (Bailey, 1994). The option to extend the taxonomy when new types of 
objects appear through the inclusion of additional dimensions and new characteristics should be feasi-
ble. To be explanatory, it is important that the taxonomy is not merely descriptive, but enables the 
reader to identify the characteristics without full knowledge of the object’s details (Nickerson et al., 
2013). To meet the eight objective ending criteria, described in Table 1, which focuses on the formal 
correctness of the development process and the resulting taxonomy, we test and evaluate the taxonomy 
against the criteria after each iteration.  
Subjective ending criteria Objective ending criteria 
Concise 
Robust 
Comprehensive 
Extensible 
Explanatory 
 
All objects or a representative sample of objects have been examined. 
No object was merged with a similar object or split into multiple objects in the 
last iteration. 
At least one object is classified under every characteristic of every dimension. 
No amendments to dimensions or characteristics were made in the last iteration. 
No dimensions or characteristics were merged or split in the last iteration. 
Every dimension is unique and not repeated. 
Every characteristic is unique within its dimension. 
Each cell (combination of characteristics) is unique and is not repeated. 
Table 1. Subjective and objective ending conditions (Nickerson et al., 2013) 
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Next, for the empirical perspective of our research we took a sample of 52 real-world cases of ICOs for 
the taxonomy development and to examine them thoroughly. We selected sample cases used for the 
taxonomy building process from databases operated by Coindesk and Smith and Crown, containing an 
overview of historic and ongoing ICOs (Coindesk, 2017; Smith and Crown, 2017). For the purpose of 
validity we took a sample of cases ranging from the first known ICOs in the year 2013 until the finali-
zation of this study in late 2017. We obtained relevant information about each case from whitepapers 
and other documents accompanying the ICO such as legal term sheets, press releases and websites 
specifically set up for the purpose of informing the public about the ICO as no scientific database or 
comprehensive set of ICOs is publicly available yet. Where available, we also analyzed the smart con-
tracts code used for the ICOs to obtain in-depth knowledge. While we primarily relied on qualitative 
data, we also utilized quantitative data such as e.g. the number of tokens reserved for the team to calcu-
late the relative share. The gathered information on real-world ICOs was used as basis for the identifi-
cation of relevant ICO traits as well as for the evaluation theory-driven dimensions and characteristics. 
Subsequently, we performed step 3-7 in an iterative manner. In line with Nickerson et al. (2013), we 
reciprocally conducted conceptual-to-empirical and empirical-to-conceptual iterations. In empirical-to-
conceptual iterations, we used a subset of our sample cases and conducted detailed examinations to 
derive characteristics. By doing so, we clustered similar ICOs together and grouped the characteristics 
into dimensions. Additionally, we analysed literature related to the identified dimensions and character-
istics to strengthen and verify the findings. Subsequently, we tested the developed taxonomy against 
the ending criteria. Whenever the taxonomy failed to meet the specified ending conditions, we per-
formed another iteration. In conceptual-to-empirical iterations we utilized literature on forms of auction 
theory, IPO processes and crowdfunding to identify literature-based characteristics and dimensions. 
Subsequently, we applied a subset of our sample cases to verify the applicability of these characteris-
tics and dimensions. However, since ICOs are novel and fundamentally different to traditional ap-
proaches this approach proved of limited use. Thus, we made use of additional primary data in form of 
expert interviews. To achieve this, we chose a semi-structured interview approach with designed ques-
tions and interview guidelines to assure comparability and to preserve the explorative nature (Yin, 
2013). We framed our interviews around a green field approach to gather the unbiased knowledge and 
ideas towards ICO characteristics (conceptual-to-empirical). In addition, we discussed our current tax-
onomy with subject matter experts, which allowed us to evaluate the proposed taxonomy based on real-
world experience (empirical-to-conceptual) (Schultze and Avital, 2011).  
Id Current position Relevant experience 
1 Board member, Bitcoin Austria ICO investor 
2 Academic Researcher, University of Liechtenstein ICO advisor, ICO researcher 
3 Consultant, icon associates ICO advisor 
4 Partner, Stadler Völkel Attorneys at Law ICO advisor 
5 Academic Researcher, Technical University Munich (TUM) ICO researcher 
6 Academic Researcher, University of Warwick ICO researcher 
7 Board Member, Hydrominer ICO issuer 
Table 2. Overview of expert interviews 
In total, we conducted seven semi-structured expert interviews, which lasted between 30 and 45 
minutes, via phone, recorded them and analyzed them according to scientific standards afterwards 
(Dexter, 2006). As illustrated in Table 2, we selected experts having relevant professional experience 
as either ICO issuer, ICO investor, ICO advisor or ICO researcher. We selected all experts based on the 
criteria that they possessed either relevant practical knowledge or have made significant scientific con-
tributions in the field of ICOs. Every single expert interview was incorporated in the taxonomy devel-
opment process as a development iteration. For each interview, we analysed the expert feedback and 
incorporated significant changes in our taxonomy. For instance: While we found only minor discrepan-
cies, for the dimension Token purpose/type, where several experts preferred the legal definitions of 
utility tokens and securities. However, we decided not to follow these suggestions as the general legal 
Fridgen et al. / Don’t slip on the ICO 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 8 
 
framework of ICOs is yet unclear and differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. After this step, after each 
interview, we verified the amended taxonomy through our real-world cases and improved the taxono-
my if necessary. Finally, after 14 iterations in total, the specified ending conditions were met, and the 
interviewed experts confirmed the taxonomy as complete, comprehensive and explanatory.  
5 Taxonomy for a Blockchain-enabled form of Crowdfunding 
We present our final taxonomy in Table 3 and describe the dimensions and characteristics in detail in 
this section. The final taxonomy consists of 23 relevant dimensions encompassing 62 characteristics 
that were defined according to the specified meta-characteristic to describe the design parameters of 
ICOs. The dimensions were ordered and grouped into three thematic categories – token, issuer and 
sales terms – to increase the readability of our artefact in coordination with the experts interviewed. 
The numbers included in brackets refer to the absolute frequency of each characteristic in the analyzed 
sample. The sample classification was conducted in multiple rounds by two authors in an independent 
manner followed by discussion sessions. 
 Dimension Characteristics 
T
o
k
en
 
Token implementation level native (9) on-chain (42) 
sidechain (1) 
sidechain (1) 
Token purpose/type usage token (31) work token (3) funding token (9) staking token 
(9) Token supply growth fixed supply (38) fixed inflation rate (5) adaptive inflation rate 
(9) Token supply cap uncapped (11) capped (41) 
Token burning no (42) yes (10) 
Token distribution deferral no (22) yes (30) 
Token holder voting rights no (38) yes (14) 
Is
su
er
 Issuing legal structure limited liability (42) foundation (10) 
Team token share minority stake (45) half (3) majority stake (4) 
Team vesting period none (16) single period (15) multiple periods (21) 
S
a
le
s 
T
er
m
s 
Pre-sale before ICO none (26) private pre-sale (21) public pre-sale (5) 
Pre-sale discount no (27) yes (25) 
Planned occurrence  single round (38) multiple rounds (12) 
not specified (2) 
not specified (2) 
Registration needed no (23) yes (29) 
Eligibility restriction none (28) geographic (17) accreditation (3) multiple (4) 
Purchase amount limit none (43) minimum (6) maximum (2) both (1) 
Auction mechanism none (49) Dutch auction (3) 
Sales price fixed (42) floating (10) 
Price fixing currency fiat currency (17) crypto currency (35) 
Funding currency crypto currency (43) crypto and fiat currency (9) 
Funding cap uncapped (9) 
soft cap (2) 
soft cap (2) hard cap (27) multiple (14) 
Time horizon fixed ending date (41) fixed ending block time (10) open-end (1) 
Time-based discount none (26) single rate (5) 
multiple rates (21) 
multiple rates (21) 
Table 3. Final taxonomy of ICOs 
5.1 Token 
The basis of any ICO is a token that is sold during the ICO process. However, we found multiple tech-
nical, monetary and legal aspects where the tokens fundamentally differ and thus influence the charac-
teristics of the ICO itself. 
Token implementation level: Regarding the token implementation level we found fundamental differ-
ences between ICOs. Consistent with literature, a token can either be native, meaning it is inherent to a 
blockchain or on-chain, which means it is created as an app coin using smart contracts on top of an 
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existing blockchain like Ethereum (Buterin, 2014). In one case, the token was existing on a so-called 
sidechain, which can be interpreted as a solution in-between a blockchain and a smart contract. 
Token type/purpose: Another differentiation of tokens offered in an ICO is the token’s purpose. To-
kens can be categorized in usage tokens, which give the holder access to a digital service but generally 
does not include rights to contribute or earn rewards, work tokens, which enable holders to contribute 
work to a network such as a decentralized organization (Tomaino, 2017), funding tokens, which ac-
cording to one expert interviewed have no other use than to raise funds and staking tokens, which refers 
to the potential use of tokens as right to be a stakeholder, participate in a network’s decisions and in 
some cases earn a reward (Buterin, 2017b; Muehlemann, 2017). 
Token supply growth: The underlying tokens differ in terms of general token supply growth. We 
found most of the analyzed cases to have a fixed supply, meaning no further tokens are issued in the 
future through mining or otherwise (Conley, 2017). Experts pointed out in the interview process that in 
some cases, a fixed inflation rate or an adjustable inflation rate exist and referred to an adjustable in-
crease of the token supply as voted for by stakeholders as example. 
Token supply cap: The supply of tokens (number of tokens) available to buyers in an ICO can be re-
stricted, which is typically referred to as capped in sales prospects and whitepapers. Unrestricted token 
supply during the ICO process is consequently referred to as uncapped (Buterin, 2017a). 
Token burning: As in some cases it was explicitly stated that unsold tokens are being destructed, 
which is also referred to as token burning, we included the dimension with the characteristics no and 
yes in our taxonomy (Buterin, 2017b). 
Token distribution deferral: Our taxonomy research process revealed that most tokens are not dis-
tributed to buyers outright after completion of the ICO. Instead the distribution is facilitated after a 
specified deferral period. These findings were confirmed when conducting expert interviews, thus we 
integrated this dimension with the characteristics no and yes in our taxonomy. 
Token holder voting rights: It was pointed out by several experts that while for most tokens, the 
holders do not possess any voting rights, some tokens do enable holders to vote on certain proposals. 
Thus, we include the dimension with the characteristics no and yes in our taxonomy. 
5.2 Issuer 
Behind every ICO we examined, we found a team of people or an organisation using a legal structure 
to facilitate the process, while keeping a certain percentage of the tokens for themselves, sometimes 
with self-imposed restrictions. 
Issuing legal structure: In expert interviews, it was mentioned multiple times that the issuing legal 
structure is another important dimension which should be included in the taxonomy. In line with our 
aim to provide practitioners with valuable insights common organizational structures are of vital im-
portance. Thus, we decided to include the dimension issuing legal structure. Analysing further cases, 
we found limited liability and foundation to be used, which was confirmed by a legally skilled inter-
view partner afterwards.  
Team token share: The examination of sample cases revealed that the team responsible for issuing 
tokens during an ICO typically keeps a sizable portion of tokens for themselves. We distinguish ICOs 
where the team owns a minority stake, half or a majority stake of the tokens at completion of an ICO. 
Team vesting period: Consequently, the ability of the team or company behind an ICO has the power 
to influence the market price of tokens by selling their stake (Buterin, 2017a). To avoid opportunistic 
profit taking and to protect investors, we found some ICOs to contain a clause specifying that the to-
kens of team members or the company are locked-up for a certain period. Some cases even contain a 
more sophisticated approach of multiple periods, bound to certain success criteria. As lock-up periods 
are also common in IPOs and Venture Capital, where they are referred to as vesting period, we include 
the characteristics single period and multiple periods beside none in our taxonomy (Ehrsam, 2017). 
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5.3 Sales Terms 
We found multiple design parameters of ICOs regarding the sales process that add further complexity, 
which we included in a separate category. Typically, these parameters are included in the sales terms of 
an ICO. 
Pre-Sale before ICO: While examining ICO cases, it is notable that some ICOs are preceded by a pre-
sale that is declared as part of the overall ICO process. We found these to be either limited to advisors, 
community members or accredited investors or open to the public. Thus, we include this dimension 
with the characteristics private pre-sale, public pre-sale and no presale in our taxonomy. The useful-
ness of the dimension was confirmed when interviewing experts. 
Pre-Sale discount: Following up on the identified dimension of pre-sales preceding ICOs, we found 
that in some cases tokens were offered at a discount to buyers. Thus, we included the finding in our 
taxonomy (yes / no).  
Planned occurrence: The analysis of cases revealed that while most ICOs are one-time events, in 
some cases the party issuing tokens is actively planning multiple investing rounds. In some instances, 
the issuing party deliberately left open the technical possibility of a second ICO, while communicating 
it as a mere possibility. Thus, we include the characteristics single round, multiple rounds as well as 
not specified in our taxonomy. 
Registration needed: Recent attention of regulators as discussed above seems to impact the need of 
registration before the purchase of tokens at an ICO. We found many recent cases to require up-front 
registration of prospective buyers. In contrast, the older cases we researched typically did not require 
investors to register. These findings were also confirmed by the experts we interviewed. Thus, we in-
clude the dimension with the characteristics no and yes in our taxonomy. 
Eligibility restriction: With required registration, the possibility of restricting investors is introduced. 
While in some cases we found no eligibility restrictions, in others geographic restrictions applied, or 
access was only permitted to investors with accreditation as defined by national regulations. In a few 
cases we also found multiple restrictions. Interestingly, we found these restrictions to resemble the 
regulations for traditionally crowdfunding (Sixt, 2014). 
Purchase amount limit: During analysis of cases we found differences for allowed purchase amounts. 
While most cases had no specified purchase amount limits (none), in some cases we found a minimum 
or a maximum purchase amount limit or in a few cases both limits were in place. 
Auction mechanism: The analysis of ICO cases revealed that a few cases of token sales were conduct-
ed using auction mechanisms such as various forms of a so called Dutch auction. In a Dutch auction, 
an auctioneer first announces a very high price and gradually lowers it until it is accepted by one of the 
bidders (Hausch et al., 1992). More specifically, we found second-price Dutch auctions, as well as 
inverse Dutch auctions to be used in ICOs, which we subsumed under the characteristic. While both 
auction theory literature and expert interviews pointed us to additional forms of auctions that could be 
used in theory (e.g. Vickrey auctions), no case was found where other forms of auctions have been 
tried in ICOs so far (Teutsch and Buterin, 2017). 
Sales price: Research of cases revealed that ICOs differ at the sales prices, which can either be fixed or 
floating, meaning it fluctuates and is influenced by factors such as demand. Experts pointed out that 
this dimension can best be understood in combination with the auction mechanism used. 
Price fixing currency: As we found token sales prices to be fixed for some cases, a deeper look into 
the currency the token is fixed in revealed that prices can either be fixed in cryptocurrency, such as 
Bitcoin or Ether, or in fiat currency. The latter is a term for currency established by governments to 
centre an economy onto one kind of transaction medium (e.g. Euro or US-Dollar) (ECB, 2015). 
Funding currency: Analogous to the options for fixing a price, the funding currency that can be used 
to purchase tokens in an ICO can be either cryptocurrency, or in a few cases both, fiat currency and 
cryptocurrency, as our research showed. 
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Funding cap: We identified the existence of funding caps in some cases, whereby a distinction be-
tween hard capped and soft capped limits has to be made. The former term relates to a restriction that 
ends an ICO immediately, as soon as a certain amount of funding has been reached. The latter term 
relates to a minimum amount of funding that must be reached to trigger a time limit of the remaining 
ICO period (Luxembourg House of Financial Technology and Stellar Development Foundation, 2017). 
ICOs that do not have one or even multiple funding caps, are typically referred to as uncapped. Litera-
ture analysis of crowdfunding revealed that increasing funding goal size is negatively associated with 
success within a reward- and donation-based crowdfunding setting (Mollick, 2014). Further research 
could address this question for ICOs as well. 
Time horizon: While in most cases a fixed ending date is specified as ending condition of the ICO, in 
a few cases we found fixed ending block time to be used. Block time relates to the occurrence of a spe-
cific block of a blockchain being mined, which usually can be predicted with limited accuracy (Swan, 
2016). In some cases, the time horizon for an ICO was being kept open and no ending criteria based on 
time was specified at all. Related research of equity-based crowdfunding found that increased duration 
of funding a project decreases the chance of success (Danmayr, 2014). Further research might show, if 
similar implication for ICOs can be observed. 
Time based discount: When analysing ICOs we found time-based discounts a common sales term. 
While in some cases the discount consisted of a single rate, in a few cases a more sophisticated system 
of multiple discount rates was utilized. These findings were confirmed by experts as well. 
5.4 Application of the proposed Taxonomy 
Developing the proposed taxonomy, we dissected and systematically classified 52 real-world ICOs. 
Overall, in the majority of ICO cases (81%) the tokens are instantiated as on-chain tokens, classified as 
usage tokens (60%) and distributed with a deferral (58%). Additionally, in most cases the token supply 
is fixed with no growth (73%) and the token supply is capped (79%). Burning of tokens is merely ap-
plied in a minority of the cases (19%), and so is the transfer of voting rights to investors (27%). Most 
token issuers rely on the legal structure limited liability (81%) and keep a minority of tokens within the 
team or organisation (87%). However, there are also cases where they keep the majority (8%) or half 
(6%) of tokens internally. In addition, most issuers establish some form of vesting period (69%) within 
which team members are not able to sell their tokens. Regarding pre-sales our dataset is equally bal-
anced between cases with and without pre-sales. In ICOs with a pre-sale, they are in 96% of the cases 
associated with a discount compared to the regular sales period. Most issuers conduct the token sale as 
a single round occurrence (73%), which requires a registration prior to investments (56%). Further, in 
the majority of cases no eligibility restriction (54%) and no auction mechanism (94%) is applied. It is 
apparent, that in most ICOs the sales price is fixed (81%) and bound to a cryptocurrency (67%). In-
vestments can be made in crypto currency (83%) without an investment limit per participant (83%). 
The number of tokens distributed is in most cases limited in some way (83%) and the sales period has a 
fixed ending date or block time (98%). Further, in every second ICO time-based discounts are applied. 
To better understand the ICO phenomenon and to illustrate the usefulness of our taxonomy we con-
ducted a cluster analysis to identify ICO archetypes. For clarity and comprehensibility, we restrict the 
number of clusters to four. We utilize the simple-K-means algorithm (distance function: Euclidean 
distance) in our analysis (Arthur and Vassilvitskii, 2007). We summarize the results of the cluster anal-
ysis and highlight prevailing characteristics of each cluster in Table 4. Hereinafter, we describe the four 
ICO archetypes of our dataset, which indicate how common ICOs are designed and thus might serves 
as best practices. 
Cluster 1 - Geographically restricted ICOs with hard funding caps and private pre-sales: This 
archetype represents the largest group of ICOs and reveals particularly interesting characteristics in the 
dimensions pre-sale before ICO, pre-sale discount, eligibility restriction and funding cap. ICOs within 
this cluster offer a private pre-sale with discount, are geographically restricted and reveal a hard fund-
ing cap. 
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Cluster 2 - Geographically restricted ICOs with fiat money-oriented pricings and staking tokens: 
In this cluster the dimensions token purpose/type, token holder voting rights and price fixing currency 
are striking. This archetype uses staking tokens and transfers voting rights to investors. Further, ICOs 
are geographically restricted and token prices are fixed in a fiat currency. 
Cluster 3 - Uncapped global foundation ICOs with native blockchain tokens: ICOs classified into 
cluster 3 are especially characterized by their manifestations in the dimensions token implementation 
level, token supply growth and cap as well as issuing legal structure and planned occurrence. This 
archetype builds upon native tokens, reveals an uncapped token supply and a fixed inflation rate re-
garding to the token supply growth. Further, it is the only archetype that covers multiple investment 
rounds.  
Cluster 4 - Global ICOs with hard funding caps: This archetype does not reveal unique characteris-
tics but rather represents combinations of distinctive traits of the other three clusters. This archetype 
uses on-chain tokens, allows for global investments and exposes a hard funding cap. 
 
 Cluster 1 (40%) Cluster 2 (13%) Cluster 3 (13%) Cluster 4 (33%) 
Token implementation level on-chain on-chain native on-chain 
Token purpose/type usage token staking token usage token usage token 
Token supply growth fixed supply fixed supply fixed inflation  fixed supply 
Token supply cap capped capped uncapped capped 
Token burning no no no no 
Token distribution deferral yes yes yes yes 
Token holder voting rights no yes no no 
Issuing legal structure Limited Limited Foundation Limited 
Team token share minority stake minority stake minority stake minority stake 
Team vesting period multiple periods multiple periods no no 
Pre-sale before ICO private presale no no no 
Pre-sale discount yes no no no 
Planned occurrence  single round single round multiple round single round 
Registration needed yes yes no no 
Eligibility restriction geographic geographic none none 
Purchase amount limit none none none none 
Auction mechanism none none none none 
Sales price fixed fixed fixed fixed 
Price fixing currency cryptocurrency fiat currency cryptocurrency cryptocurrency 
Funding currency cryptocurrency cryptocurrency cryptocurrency cryptocurrency 
Funding cap hard cap multiple uncapped hard cap 
Time horizon fixed ending date fixed ending date fixed ending date fixed ending date 
Time-based discount none multiple rates multiple rates none 
Table 4. Results of the cluster analysis 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
We investigated the implications of blockchain technology with a specific focus on ICOs as a novel 
approach to crowdfunding. Since ICOs have emerged as a new phenomenon, IS researchers, investors, 
practitioners and financial regulators alike struggle to fully understand the different forms and associat-
ed consequences. This is also caused by the complex and heterogenous characteristics of ICOs that 
allow for various instantiations. Further, scientific literature on ICO characteristics and underlying 
technologies is missing. To bridge this research gap, we focused our research on the identification and 
evaluation of ICO design parameters. To achieve this, we followed the taxonomy development method 
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of Nickerson et al. (2013) and propose a taxonomy for ICOs. In the development, we primarily built on 
empirical data from both real-world ICO cases and expert knowledge from semi-structured interviews 
with practitioners involved in ICOs. We collected data of 52 ICOs and conducted seven semi-
structured interviews with ICO experts. Our proposed taxonomy consists of three categories with a 
total of 23 dimensions and allows researchers and practitioners (e.g. ICO investors) to better under-
stand ICOs and associated consequences.  
Before stating our recommendations and emphasizing our contribution to both research and practice, 
we acknowledge some limitations that open promising avenues for further research. First, although we 
used Coindesk and Smith and Crown as established basis for our real-world ICO cases, the dimensions 
and characteristics are influenced by the applied data sample and the sequence of iterations in the de-
velopment process, which depicts a generally valid drawback. By applying a divergent sequence of 
iterations and additional cases, further research may further evaluate proposed taxonomy. Second, 
globally, 222 ICOs (as of November 15th, 2017) have taken place, we utilized an appropriate dataset, 
however we might have missed some instantiations that rapidly evolve in the ICO market (Coindesk, 
2017). Further research might function as an update of our taxonomy and include ICO cases that oc-
curred after November 15th. Third, in our research, we did not have a specific focus on dependencies 
between dimensions and characteristics as well as success criteria of ICOs. Thus, future research might 
use our taxonomy as a promising starting point to explore potential dependencies. In addition, the suc-
cess of ICOs both in the eyes of issuers and investors is subject to promising research. The parameters 
listed in our taxonomy can serve as a starting point for analysis of success factors that might explain 
not only ICO events itself, but could also shed light on token performance on secondary markets. 
Fourth, the generalizability of our ICO archetypes needs to be verified through further research. How-
ever, our cluster analysis and the identified ICO archetypes might serve as a profound basis for in-
depth case study research to better understand the ICO processes. It also remains for future research to 
examine how ICOs further develop and how the fast developments of blockchain technology influence 
ICOs.  
The theoretical contribution of our research addresses the aforementioned research gap in three ways. 
First, to the best of our knowledge our taxonomy is the first scientific artefact that contributes to the 
descriptive knowledge of the young research domain of ICOs. While existing research focuses on im-
portant areas like how to conduct ICOs and launch ICO platforms (Li and Mann, 2018), our research 
represents a first step to address the call for in-depth analyses on ICOs (Clayton, 2017). By developing 
our descriptive taxonomy, we conducted an important step towards the development of a higher-order 
theory (e.g., predictive theory, theory for design and action) (Gregor, 2006). Second, we lay the foun-
dation for further research in the area of ICOs, and their establishment as a form of crowdfunding. We 
achieved this objective by addressing specific characteristics of ICOs to improve the understanding, 
providing a scientifically selected set of ICO cases and by highlighting promising avenues for future 
research. Third, our cluster analysis that identified ICO archetypes represent a first step towards the 
identification of predominant ICO types, which might evolve into established forms of crowdfunding. 
Besides its theoretical contribution, our paper provides practitioners with valuable insights. First, we 
offer insights into ICOs and delineate the essential design options that can help individuals or organisa-
tions that analyse, advice or consider launching an ICO. Second, as there is no one-size-fits-all model 
of ICOs, our taxonomy can aid the decision-making process of choosing the specific parameters of an 
ICO. Third, the proposed ICO clusters indicate how common ICOs are designed and thus might serves 
as best practices for practitioners. Fourth, our work suggests that ICOs are a valid alternative to crowd-
funding that has to be considered and understood when making strategic decisions such as raising capi-
tal for a project. 
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